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Abstract
Group judgments are often influenced by their members’ indi-
vidual expertise. It is less clear, though, how individual expertise
should affect the group judgments. This paper surveys a wide range
of formal models of opinion aggregation and group judgment: mod-
els where all group members have the same impact on the group
judgment, models that take into account differences in individual ac-
curacy, and models where group members revise their beliefs as a
function of their mutual respect. The scope of these models covers
the aggregation of propositional attitudes, probability functions, and
numerical estimates. By comparing these different kinds of models
and contrasting them with findings in psychology, management sci-
ence and the expert judgment literature, we gain a better understand-
ing of the role of expertise in group agency, both from a theoretical
and an empirical perspective.
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1 Introduction
Members of a group are often in disagreement with each other. Analysts
at Apple or Samsung come up with different estimates of how often a
newly developed cell phone will be sold. Conservation biologists disagree
on the population size of an endangered species. Researchers at the Euro-
pean Central Bank cannot find a consensus on the merits and drawbacks
of a particular monetary policy. In all these cases, disagreement need not
be a bad thing. What is more, it can be seen as epistemically and socially
desirable. Armstrong (2001) and Page (2007) argue, among others, that
the diversity of opinion characteristic of disagreement can act as an anti-
dote to groupthink and foster the development of alternative approaches
whose pursuit may be more fruitful than following well-trodden paths.
On the other hand, disagreement can block the formation of group
judgment and delay important decisions. To stay with one of the above
examples, the European Central Bank needs to come up with some decision
on whether to ease or to tighten monetary policy. Also in science, it seems
that a certain degree of consensus is necessary for scientific progress and
for conducting “normal science” (Kuhn 1962, 1977). So how should groups
aggregate (or pool) the opinions of their members?
This question has no clear-cut, unique answer. One reason is the di-
versity of contexts where groups aggregate individual opinions, and the
different goals they aim at. Another reason is the diversity of criteria
for evaluating aggregation procedures, e.g., epistemic and social ones. In
the epistemic perspective, opinion aggregation procedures are primarily
assessed according to their veracity, that is, their success at tracking the
truth. In the social perspective, they are judged on different criteria: Was
the opinion of every individual duly taken into account? Is the final result
acceptable to all group members? Did it emerge from a procedure that ev-
erybody consented to? And so on. To give a crude example, a dictatorship
is usually ruled out in the social perspective, but it may be acceptable from
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an epistemic perspective, if that individual is by far the most competent
group member.
There are two principled ways of aggregating opinions and resolv-
ing disagreements: with and without belief revision on an individual
level. The main part of the paper is devoted to models of opinion aggre-
gation that do not involve belief revision. Such models describe in a formal
framework how opinion aggregation procedures should (or factually do)
work.1 However, we will also contrast them with consensual decision-
making where individuals revise their beliefs and eventually agree on the
subject matter of disagreement. Typical driving factors of such procedures
are deliberation and considerations of power and mutual respect.
It is useful to divide opinion aggregation models that do not involve
deliberation or belief revision into two categories. In the first category are
egalitarian models—a term supposed to capture the fact that no individ-
ual has a special or privileged position. They are particularly important in
contexts where it is hard to argue for giving special weight to a specific in-
dividual, e.g., because relevant expertise is hard to elicit. Sometimes, it is
even one of the constraints on an aggregation procedure that the opinions
be “anonymous”, that is, that the final outcome (the group opinion) do not
depend on the individual agents that submitted a view. This aggregation
procedure is acting like the famous allegory of justice: It weighs opinions
impartially and regardless of the agent’s identities.
The use of egalitarian models may have epistemic, procedural or prag-
matic reasons. For example, the equality of individual votes in elections
or referenda—a particular case of social opinion aggregation—has consti-
tutional status in most democracies. Therefore, choosing an egalitarian
procedure may be pragmatically required. Hence, it comes at no surprise
that egalitarian aggregation procedures, such as various forms of majority
or plurality voting, play a major role in political processes.
The second category of aggregation models—which we will call differ-
ential models—give differential weights to the individual group members.
This procedure can have psychological as well as epistemic motivations:
Firstly, “fringe opinions” — i.e. those that are far away from the group av-
erage — may receive low weight precisely because they appear to be wide
off the mark, and nobody else is willing to take them seriously. Secondly,
when the task is intellective, that is, when it involves a high level of demon-
strability, some group members may be more competent than others. In
1We use “procedure” as a generic word for ways to aggregate opinions and to resolve
disagreements, whereas “model” denotes a particular formal framework for describing
these procedures.
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such tasks, the opinions of the experts might receive higher consideration
in determining the group view. Here we think of experts as the more com-
petent group members, that is, those whose opinion coincides more often
with the truth, or contains the smallest error. Thirdly, there are group
members that may, because of their position or their appearance, receive
more respect or esteem than others in the peer-group, and it may be pro-
cedurally or pragmatically necessary to endow them with a higher weight
than their peers.
Which of all these procedures is applied in practice is a context-sensitive
issue: For instance, in a meeting of the heads of state of the European
Union on foreign policy or the EU budget, the primary goal may consist in
finding a consensual position, and that need not necessarily involve egal-
itarian decision-making. Also when the epistemic accuracy of the group
judgment has the highest priority, e.g., in scientific reasoning, it may be ra-
tional to weigh differentially and to defer to experts. More generally, List
(2005) distinguishes between two challenges for group judgments: the “ra-
tionality challenge” of endorsing a consistent collective judgment on an
interconnected agenda of propositions, and the “knowledge challenge”,
that is, to track truth in these collective judgments. Both challenges will
be discussed in this paper.
Finally, we should distinguish between weighting strategies and weight-
ing schemes. A strategy is general: In the classification presented in this
paper, it is either egalitarian or differential. A scheme is specific: It is clear
that once a differential weighting strategy has been selected, a specific set
of weights (a scheme) is needed. Perhaps contrary to our intuitions, egal-
itarian aggregation procedures can allow for different weighting schemes.
Equal weights views in the epistemology of disagreement literature are
often vague on the issue of which specific function aggregates the indi-
vidual opinions; for example, the “equal-weight view” is sometimes inter-
preted in a Bayesian scheme (Elga 2007) and other times as linear averag-
ing (Christensen 2009).
In sum, this paper sketches a rough map of diverse approaches to
aggregating group opinions that matter for science, politics and social
decision-making more generally. Particular attention will be devoted to
differential models, and among them, to models where an agent’s weight
is determined by his or her expertise in the subject area. These models
are contrasted with egalitarian or power-based opinion aggregation. No-
tably, we omit the problem of information aggregation and assume that
all agents are on a par with respect to the available information. Possi-
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ble differences between them are thus a matter of different judgmental
prowess.
The two following sections are devoted to the problem of group ratio-
nality in opinion aggregation: how should a group aggregate individual
opinions if constrained by a set of epistemic or social requirements? While
Section 2 deals with aggregating binary propositional attitudes, that is,
yes-no judgments, Section 3 investigates the aggregation of graded atti-
tudes, and in particular, probability distributions. Sections 4 and 5 both
describe the problem of aggregating numerical estimates, but from dif-
ferent perspectives. First, we examine philosophical and empirical moti-
vations for consensual belief revision in the light of disagreement and
review a major formal model of such a procedure, the Lehrer-Wagner
model. Then, we conduct an analysis of the epistemic benefits of dif-
ferential weighting as opposed to straight averaging. Section 6 gives an
overview of empirical findings on expertise, e.g., the identification and
ranking of experts, and relates them to the formal results. Section 7 con-
cludes.
2 Judgment Aggregation
Judgment aggregation is a recent field at the intersection of philosophy
and economics. It deals with the aggregation of individual judgments
on an interconnected set of propositions into a coherent group judgment
and asks what kind of aggregation procedure rationality requires us to
choose. For our purposes, judgment aggregation is particularly interesting
because procedural constraints may require democratic decision-making,
where social and epistemic features of individual agents are not taken into
account. Judgment aggregation procedures are typically egalitarian: no
single person obtains more weight than others because of his/her stand-
ing in the group or his/her competence. Studying judgment aggregation,
and its problems and methods, also yields a better understanding of the
advantages and drawbacks of differential weighting in opinion aggrega-
tion.
Notably, it has been shown that the classical economic problem of pref-
erence aggregation can be embedded into the problem of judgment aggre-
gation (Dietrich and List 2008; Grossi 2009). Classical results such as Ar-
row’s impossibility theorem can be represented as impossibility theorems
for aggregating judgments on logically interconnected propositions. This
increases the generality and relevance of theoretical results on judgment
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aggregation.
Let us now formulate the classical problem of judgment aggregation.
Assume that N agents are supposed to aggregate their binary judgments
on an agenda of propositions X = {A1, . . . , Am} where the Ak can be log-
ically interconnected. Call Ji the judgment set of agent i. Then we can ask
ourselves which kind of condition should be satisfied by an aggregation
function F : J n → J that maps the individual agents’ judgment sets to a
group judgment set F(J1, . . . , Jn).
Among the most popular conditions are:
Universal Domain Any combination of consistent individual judgments
is in the domain of F.
Collective Rationality F(J1, . . . , Jn) is a consistent and complete collective
judgment set on F.
Anonymity For any two profiles (J1, . . . , Jn) and (J′1, . . . , J
′
n) which are per-
mutations of each other, F(J1, . . . , Jn) = F(J′1, . . . , J
′
n).
The first two conditions, Universal Domain and Collective Rationality, ex-
press that we are looking for a general aggregation procedure that outputs
consistent group judgments. Anonymity articulates the egalitarian intu-
ition: the group judgment set is invariant with respect to the “position” of
an agent in the group. This is evidently inspired by democratic decision-
making where votes are cast anonymously and cannot be traced back to
the voter. As a consequence, the idea of experts who have special weight in
the group is eliminated in favor of having a genuinely egalitarian decision
model.
For judgment aggregation, this natural idea has an awkward conse-
quence as soon as another condition, Systematicity, is added. That condi-
tion requires, informally, (i) that the group judgment on each proposition
in the agenda depend only on individual judgments on that particular
proposition, (ii) that the same aggregation criterion be used for each sin-
gle proposition. In a much-cited paper, List and Pettit show that the above
four criteria are jointly incompatible with each other.
Theorem 1 (Classic Impossibility Result for Judgment Aggregation) There
is no judgment aggregation function that satisfies Universal Domain, Collective
Rationality, Anonymity, and Systematicity.
(List and Pettit 2002)
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Group Member p p→ q q
Alice Yes Yes Yes
Bob Yes No No
Carol No Yes No
Majority Judgment Yes Yes No
Table 1: The discursive dilemma for majority voting illustrates the impos-
sibility result by List and Pettit.
This impossibility result has subsequently been extended and generalized—
see List and Puppe (2009) and List (2012) for introductory reviews. A
classic instance of List and Pettit’s impossibility result is the discursive
dilemma for majority voting. Assume that a group of three members,
Alice, Bob and Carol, have to vote on propositions p, p → q and q. If
they agree on majority voting as a judgment aggregation procedure for
all three propositions, their consistent individual judgments may yield an
inconsistent collective judgment. See Table 1 for an example.
This means that we have to part with at least one of the four above
conditions—see List (2005) for an extended discussion. Giving up Uni-
versal Domain seems to make things too easy by restricting the types of
disagreements that may occur in practice. Why shouldn’t Alice, Bob and
Carol be allowed to have all kinds of consistent individual judgments on
the agenda {p, p→ q, q}?
Abandoning Collective Rationality may look counterintuitive, but need
not be a bad idea. Suspending judgments on some of the propositions, or
choosing context-sensitive aggregation procedures with a supermajority
threshold may avoid inconsistencies. This move may also reflect that di-
verse aggregation problems demand diverse solutions. Still, it would be a
more principled option to dispute Systematicity or Anonymity instead.
Indeed, Systematicity may appear unreasonably strong as soon as one
realizes that propositions in an agenda are often interconnected: no judg-
ment is entirely independent of judgments on the other propositions. In
addition, for some propositions, e.g., those where an error has severe prac-
tical consequences, it may be reasonable to use a different quorum than
for other propositions in the agenda. Such a move would contradict Sys-
tematicity. Still, it is a delicate issue to prioritize some of the propositions
over others, and good context-sensitive reasons need to be given. An epis-
temic justification for premise-based judgment aggregation, that is, judg-
ment aggregation on the reasons for a group decision, has been provided
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by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2010)
and Hartmann and Sprenger (2012).
In favor of abandoning Anonymity, it could be said that procedural
uniformity (as encoded in Systematicity) is a big practical asset. Also,
some agents may possess a higher level of expertise than others. All this
motivates the abandonment of Anonymity and the investigation of differ-
ential models where systematicity-like conditions can be maintained. We
will examine them in the next section. However, practical constraints (e.g.,
democratic decision-making) often require that Anonymity be endorsed.
Therefore, a solution among these lines can only be partial.
Let us now turn to the aggregation of fine-graded epistemic attitudes,
such as probabilistic degrees of belief. Perhaps the impossibility results for
judgment aggregation are just an artifact of the binary aggregation setting
and will disappear in the more expressive probabilistic framework?
3 Probability Aggregation
The problem of probability aggregation is to reconcile probability mea-
sures over a σ-algebra A into a single (group) probability measure. These
probailities can be naturally interpreted as representing epistemic atti-
tudes, that is, as individual and collective degrees of belief over the propo-
sitions in the algebra. Formally, we are looking for an aggregation func-
tion F : Pn → P that maps individual probability measures over A,
(p1, . . . , pn), to a group probability measure p∗.
A natural constraint on probability aggregation is Convexity, stating
that the group probability of a proposition A, p∗(A), should lie in be-
tween the minimum and the maximum of the individual probabilities
(p1(A), . . . , pn(A)). Therefore, some form of averaging (e.g. arithmetic
or geometric, with or without weights) appears to be the natural solution
to the problem of reconciling probability distributions.
Another natural constraint is the
Strong Setwise Function Property (SSFP) There is a function g : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1] such that for any event A ∈ A:
F(p1, . . . , pN)(A) = g(p1(A), . . . , pN(A))
This condition requires, similar to Systematicity in judgment aggregation,
that the group probability of any proposition A only depend on the in-
dividual probabilities of A, and be screened off from other propositions.
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SSFP directly yields the
Zero Preservation Property (ZPP) If for a proposition A ∈ A and all group
members {1, . . . , N}, p1(A) = . . . = pN(A) = 0, then also F(p1, . . . , pN)(A) =
0.
ZPP expresses the very natural idea that if every agent considers an event
impossible (probability zero), then also the group should find it impossi-
ble.
As shown independently by McConway (1981) and Wagner (1982), any
probability aggregation function that satisfies SSFP is a linear aggregation
rule:
Theorem 2 (McConway 1981, Wagner 1982) - Any probability aggregation func-
tion F : Pn → P over an algebra A that satisfies SSFP is of the form
F(p1, . . . , pN)(A) =
n
∑
j=1
ωj pj(A) (1)
for some weights ω1, . . . ,ωn ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑nj=1 ωj = 1.
In other words, probability aggregation in agreement with SSFP reduces to
a linear average of the individual probabilities. Note that the weights need
not be equal to each other, as a purely egalitarian model would require.
This consequence of SSFP is very elegant, but it leads into trouble—like
the consequences of its judgment aggregation counterpart Systematicity.
Consider the following property:
Independence Preservation Whenever for two propositions A, B ∈ A, we
have pj(A ∧ B) = pj(A) · pj(B) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, then also
F(p1, . . . , pN)(A ∧ B) = F(p1, . . . , pN)(A) · F(p1, . . . , pN)(B)
In other words, if all group members agree that two propositions are prob-
abilistically independent, then this independence should be preserved in
the group judgment. Unfortunately, this reasonable property is incompat-
ible with SSFP:
Theorem 3 (Lehrer and Wagner 1983) There is no non-dictatorial probability
aggregation function F : Pn → P over an algebra A that satisfies SSFP as well
as Indepedence Preservation.
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In addition, linear probability aggregation (that is, aggregation in agree-
ment with SSFP) does not commute with Bayesian Conditionalization.
And a natural rule that commutes with Conditionalization, like geometric
averaging, fail to satisfy other desirable properties, such as Zero Preserva-
tion and Independence Preservation—see Brössel and Eder (2013) for an
overview. Similar results hold, by the way, for the aggregation of causal
judgments, that is, the aggregation of causal (in)dependency relations rep-
resented by directed acyclical graphs (Bradley, Dietrich and List 2014).
One of the responses to Lehrer and Wagner’s impossibility results is to
restrict SSFP to a subset of propositions (see Genest and Zidek (1986) for
a review). This move is again parallel to the judgment aggregation liter-
ature where premise- and conclusion-based aggregation rules have been
investigated. Another option is the adoption of a full Bayesian model for
aggregating probability distributions (e.g., Lindley 1983).
The numerous impossibility results that exist in both domains—judgment
aggregation and probability aggregation—suggest that the aggregation of
epistemic attitudes on an interconnected set of propositions is just a very
hard problem. It is also clear that the egalitarian presumption of judgment
aggregation (Anonymity) is not the culprit for the impossibility results
since similar results hold for linear aggregation procedures with differ-
ential weights. Rather, the results suggest that it is the logical connection
between the propositions in the agenda that creates problems for “natural”
aggregation procedures.
In the remainder, we therefore focus on aggregation procedures for a
single proposition, or for estimators of a numerical quantity. This makes
the impossibility results disappear, but it also leads to a shift in focus: we
introduce models of differential opinion aggregation and compare their
epistemic performance to egalitarian models.
4 Consensual Opinion Aggregation
When real groups make judgments or decisions, their members interact
with each other: they exchange relevant information, put forward argu-
ments and deliberate the reasons for a particular position. The previous
sections did not take such interactions into account. And while it would go
beyond the scope of this article to review the psychological and philosoph-
ical literature on group interactions, a particular phenomenon is relevant
for our purposes: the tendency toward uniformity.
A long research tradition in social psychologists explores how groups
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combine individual judgments, and which decision rule (e.g., simple ma-
jority, weighted majority, “truth wins”, etc.) describes the group behavior
best (e.g., Lorge and Solomon 1959). In a classic study on group judgments
in intellective problems (that is, problems with a high level of demonstra-
bility), Thomas and Fink (1961) compare three different models: an in-
dependent model, where the group reliability is just the probability that
each group member has solved the problem, a rational model, where the
group makes a correct judgment as soon as a single member is right, and
a consensus model, which assumes the group’s inclination toward uni-
formity. Using an arithmetically simple, but conceptually tricky mathe-
matical problem, the authors find that the consensus model describes the
outcomes better than the other two.
Presumably inspired by these findings, Davis (1973, 122) developed
the influential Social Decision Scheme (SDS) model where probability dis-
tributions that describe individual preferences are transformed into a group
probability distribution over the alternatives. That is, group members
make an individual judgment in terms of a probability distribution which
is subsequently transformed into a group judgment, by means of a ma-
trix multiplication procedure. Extensions of this approach to the problem
of combining numerical estimates have been provided by Davis (1996)’s
Social Judgment Scheme, and Hinsz (1999)’s SDS-Q (“Q” standing for
“quantitative”) models. In these cases, weights may also be determined
as a function of the centrality of an estimate and its distance to other esti-
mates.
While these models are silent on the mental attitudes of the group
members, they inspire the philosophical question of whether it is ratio-
nal to revise one’s beliefs or estimates in the light of disagreement with
other group members. This question has received much attention in the
recent epistemology literature on peer disagreement (e.g., Kelly 2005; Elga
2007), but it has also been applied to group judgments. In particular,
philosophers have asked themselves whether it is possible to give rational
foundations to consensual opinion aggregation.
The most popular idea is that mutual respect among the group mem-
bers should prompt every group member to revise her initial opinion. This
respect can be epistemically motivated (e.g., by realizing that the other
group members are no less competent that oneself), but also reflect de-
grees of care or relations of social power, dependent on whether there is
a matter of fact to the subject of disagreement. Conditional on such mu-
tual respect, blending one’s opinions with the opinions of the other group
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members seems to be a requirement of rationality:
One justification for aggregation is consistency, since refusing
to aggregate is equivalent to assigning everyone else a weight
of zero [. . . ]. (Lehrer and Wagner 1981, 43)
In other words, refusing to blend one’s opinions would amount to un-
justified dogmatism (see also Lehrer 1976). This argument is, by the way,
independent of the question of whether the aggregation procedure should
be differential or egalitarian. It just motivates the view that group ratio-
nality need not be a question of choosing the right aggregation procedure
at group level, but also a question of individual belief revision.
Among respect-based models of opinion aggregation, the Lehrer-Wagner
model is most prominent. It was first developed as a descriptive mathe-
matical model of group power relations in French (1956) and as a general
model of consensus formation in DeGroot (1974). While DeGroot intended
his model to be normative, his research focused on the fundamental math-
ematical properties of the model, leaving the interpretation, further elabo-
ration, and philosophical justification to Lehrer and Wagner (1981).
The model tackles the problem of estimating a particular quantity x,
from the individual estimates vi of every group member i. This quantity
x is normally thought of as objective and independent of the group mem-
bers’ cognitive states. The quantity x in dispute might, for instance, be the
size of the population of an endangered species, or the number of rainy
days in the Netherlands in 2014.
Lehrer and Wagner’s central idea consists in ascribing the agents be-
liefs about each other’s expertise, or in other words, mutual assignments
of respect as epistemic agents on the issue at hand. Then, the wij describe
the proportion to which j’s opinion on the subject matter in question af-
fects i’s revised opinion. These mutual respect assignments are used to
revise the original estimates of the quantity in question, and codified in an
N × N matrix W (where N denotes the number of agents in the group):
W =

w11 w12 . . . w1N
w21 w22 . . . w2N
. . . . . . . . . . . .
wN1 wN2 . . . wNN
 .
The values in each row are nonnegative and normalized so as to sum
to 1: ∑Nj=1 wij = 1. Thus, the wij represent relative weights which the
agents ascribe to themselves and to others when it comes to estimating
the unknown value x. Then, W is multiplied with a vector v that contains
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the agents’ individual estimates of x, obtaining a novel updated value for
v:
W · v =

w11v1 + w12v2 + . . . + w1NvN
w21v1 + w22v2 + . . . + w2NvN
. . .
wN1v1 + wN2v2 + . . . + wNNvN
 .
In general, this procedure will not directly lead to consensus, since the
entries of W · v differ: (Wv)i 6= (Wv)j. However, Lehrer and Wagner (1981)
show that under very weak constraints, the sequence (Wk)k∈N converges
to a matrix W∞ where all rows are identical, that is, where all agents agree
on their relative weights. That is, when the procedure of averaging is
repeated, the agents will finally achieve a consensus and not only agree
on the factual subject matter, but also on the differential weight that each
group member should obtain.
Is the Lehrer-Wagner model a rational model of disagreement resolu-
tion and group decision-making? On the pro side, it has been shown that
the opinion changes of the agents can be represented as a form of Bayesian
updating: agents exchange information and at every step, their degrees of
belief are revised by conditioning on the pieces of information they re-
ceive from their peers (Geanakopoulos and Polemarchakis 1982; Romeijn
and Roy 2015). So Lehrer-Wagner opinion aggregation can, at least in
principle, be made compatible with Bayesian rationality standards.
On the con side, it has been argued that Lehrer and Wagner fail to
provide an epistemic story of why we should change our opinions in this
peculiar way. Suppose an agent determines and normalizes her respect
weights for the other group members. Then, it remains opaque why we
should choose a linear updating model rather than geometric weighting or
another form of averaging (Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan 2013). Indeed,
linear averaging is particularly sensitive to outliers in the individual esti-
mates. If the group members determine the relative weights as a function
of their mutual respect and independent of the submitted estimates, then
extreme opinions will have an overly large impact on the group consensus.
Another worry is that respect-based differential weights may be caused
by various forms of bias (Faust 1984; Trout 2009). When we assign weights
based on mutual respect, biases easily distort the reasons for the weights
assignment, so that there might be very little relation between the weights
assigned and the objective, epistemic, weight that a certain opinion should
receive. See the following section for a deeper analysis of this worry.
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The most prominent objection, however, concerns the justification for
repeated linear averaging. Lehrer and Wagner (1981) provide two stories
why this might be rational. The first is a temporal interpretation: the dis-
agreement after the first round of averaging is qualitatively similar to the
initial disagreement. So the only way to avoid unjustified dogmatism is
to repeat belief revision until consensus is reached. Wagner (1978) draws
an analogy to sharing anonymous position papers after each round of ag-
gregation: agents distribute their revised view and the reasons for that
view among the other group members. This is actually similar to the fa-
mous Delphi method for structured forecasting developed by the RAND
corporation (Helmer-Hirschberg 1967; Linstone and Turoff 1975): in that
procedure, group members fill in questionnaires, comment on their re-
ponses and subsequently receive a (filtered) summary of the opinions of
the other group members. This procedure is repeated until consensus is
eventually reached.
A concern with this interpretation is that second-order expertise does
not play any role. One need not be an expert oneself in order to make
an accurate judgment—as long as one is able to identify which group
members are competent and which aren’t. If the Lehrer-Wagner model
strives to be a model of group rationality, such considerations should not
be neglected. However, the second interpretation of the iterated matrix
multiplication that Lehrer and Wagner provide—as an amalgamation of
different orders of expertise—quickly becomes cognitiviely absurd since
one cannot rationally believe that considerations of fourth-, fifth- or sixth-
order expertise should be as important as first- and second-order expertise.
For more elaborate criticism of the Lehrer-Wqagner model, see Loewer
and Laddaga (1985) and Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan (2013). The latter
argue that the Lehrer-Wagner model should be understood as a model of
social influence and not as a genuinely epistemic model. In the view of
Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan, respect-based models of opinion aggrega-
tion are better suited for judgmental than for intellective tasks: that is, for
making decisions on non-factual matters, or for aggregating preferences
in a group of agents that respect each other, such as friends or colleagues.
For modeling how individual expertise increases group accuracy, models
where the weights are not determined by mutual respect, but by properly
epistemic considerations may be more adequate.
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5 An Epistemic Analysis of Differential Weighting
The previous section has investigated differential models of opinion ag-
gregation where the individual weights are correlated with a group mem-
ber’s social influence or perceived expertise. In this section, we conduct
an epistemic analysis of differential weighting procedures: which rela-
tions between objective performance indicators and the relative weights
have to hold to improve group performance with respect to the natu-
ral benchmark, straight averaging? This also addresses a lacuna in the
Lehrer-Wagner model where such a link between truth-tracking and spe-
cific weighting schemes is not provided.
A fundamental objection to differential weighting, that we address
first, is the problem of identifying experts. This question gains urgency
in the light of studies that show that in spite of modest correlations, there
is a substantial gap between actual and perceived expertise (e.g., Trotman
et al. 1983; Littlepage et al. 1995). However, expertise may also be recog-
nized implicitly. In this case, experts tend to exert greater influence on the
group judgment than non-experts (Bonner, Baumann and Dalal 2002). This
is good news because it indicates that expert-dependent decision schemes
may successfully operate without the ability to make explicit such a rank-
ing. Indeed, research on intellective tasks such as Mastermind and letter-
number-matching demonstrates that groups tend to use expert-weighted
social decision schemes for such tasks, and achieve a performance that
roughly corresponds to the best individual member (Bonner 2004; Bau-
mann and Bonner 2004). This sounds modest, but actually, it is a substan-
tial achievement if we do not know in advance who the experts are (see
also Laughlin and Ellis 1986; Libby, Trotman and Zimmer 1987; Laughlin,
Hatch et al. 2006; Bonner, Silito and Baumann 2007). In this context, it is
notable that performance feedback does not substantially help the agents
to recognize expertise and to improve performance. Anyway, these find-
ings indicate that differential weighting can be epistemically beneficial in
a variety of contexts, and that expert recognition is no practically impossi-
ble task. This brings us to the theoretical question of how we should weigh
the experts.
A classical result in this area concerns the aggregation of binary fore-
casts. Assume that we have to predict whether it will rain on the next
day. The agents are conceptualized as a group of independent forecasters
with a certain probability pi of getting the result right. How should these
forecasts be combined? Nitzan and Parous (1982) and Shapley and Grof-
man (1984) show that if rain is a priori as likely as no rain, group accu-
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racy is maximized by following a weighted majority voting rule where the
weights of the agents are proportional to their logarithmic betting odds:
wi ∝ log
pi
1− pi (2)
This result is, in fact, closely related to Bayes’ Theorem. However, it only
solves the problem of combining binary forecasts and does not address
the more general problem of combining numerical estimates of an un-
known quantity µ. These estimates can correspond to the individual opin-
ions of a group of agents, but also to the outputs of different mathematical
models, e.g., different predictions for the extent of global warming. Our
problem consists in finding a method of combining these estimates in an
advantageous way, and stating general conditions for when taking into
account individual expertise improves the group judgment.
We address this question through a simple statistical model developed
by Klein and Sprenger (2015). Their work builds on analytical work in
the forecasting and social psychology literature (Bates and Granger 1969;
Hogarth 1978), following the approach of Einhorn, Hogarth and Klempner
(1977). Because of its simplicity and generality, the Klein-Sprenger model
is especially well suited for principled comparisons of egalitarian and dif-
ferential opinion aggregation. It also stands in a venerable research tradi-
tion in social psychology: agents are modeled as independent signallers
with a certain reliability (e.g., Zajonc and Smoke 1959). Such formal mod-
els are then used as a standard for gauging empirical findings, and they
may indicate how information should be spread over the agents in order
to optimize performance in a recall task or similar cognitive problems.
Klein and Sprenger model the group members’ individual estimates
Xi, i ≤ n, as independent random variables that scatter around the true
value µ = 0 with zero bias and variance σ2i . No further distributional
assumptions are made in order to preserve the generality of the analysis.
The competence of an agent (or scientific model) is explicated as the degree
of precision in estimating the true value. Then, the epistemic question
about the epistemic benefits of differential weighting can be translated
into a precise mathematical question:
Problem: Which convex combination of estimates µˆ = ∑ni=1 ci Xi
should the agents choose in order to reduce expected square
loss?
This mathematical question serves to identify a modeling target which is
reasonably close to the actual problem and which we can use to study the
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epistemic properties of differential weighting in opinion aggregation.
It is well-known that for any such estimate µˆ, the mean square error
(MSE) can be calculated as
MSE(µˆ) = E[(µˆ− µ)2] = E
( n∑
i=1
ciXi
)2
=
n
∑
i=1
c2iE
[
X2i
]
+∑
i 6=j
cicjE[Xi]E[Xj]
=
n
∑
i=1
c2i σ
2
i (3)
which is minimized by the following assignment of the ci (cf. Lehrer and
Wagner 1981, 139):
c∗i =
(
n
∑
j=1
σ2i
σ2j
)−1
. (4)
The problem with these optimal weights is that each agent’s individual ex-
pertise would have to be known in order to calculate them. They can also
be quite extreme. Given all the biases that actual deliberation is loaded
with, e.g., ascription of expertise due to professional reputation, age or
gender, or bandwagon effects, it is unlikely that the agents succeed at un-
raveling the expertise of all other group members to such a precise degree
(cf. Nadeau, Cloutier and Gray 1993; Armstrong 2001). In line with what
has been said before, it is more realistic to expect that groups may be
qualitatively competent at identifying experts, but not at determining the
optimal weights.
Therefore the scope of the inquiry is widened:
Question: Under which conditions will differentially weighted
group judgments outperform the straight average?
A first answer is given by the following results where the differential
weights preserve the expertise ranking (see Klein and Sprenger (2015) for
all results and proofs):
Theorem 4 (First Baseline Result) Let 0 ≤ c1 ≤ . . . ≤ cn ≤ 1 be the weights
of the individual group members, that is, ∑ni=1 ci = 1. Further assume that for all
i > j:
1 ≤ ci
cj
≤ c
∗
i
c∗j
(5)
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Then the differentially weighted estimator µˆ := ∑ni=1 ciXi outperforms the straight
average. That is, MSE(µˆ) ≤ MSE(µ¯), with equality if and only if ci = 1/n for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This result demonstrates that knowledge of the exact competence of agents
is not required for improving decisions with respect to the straight average
baseline. Rather, as long as the competence is ranked in the right order,
the differentially weighted estimate will outperform the straight average.
The following result extends this finding to a case where the benefits
of differential weighting are harder to anticipate: we allow the ci to lie in
the entire [1/n, c∗i ] interval, allowing for cases where the ranking of the
group members is not represented correctly. One might conjecture that
this phenomenon adversely affects performance, but this is not the case:
Theorem 5 (Second Baseline Result) Let c1 . . . cn ∈ [0, 1] be such that∑ni=1 ci =
1. In addition, let ci ∈ [ 1n ; c∗i ] (respectively ci ∈ [c∗i ; 1n ]) hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤
n. Then the differentially weighted estimator µˆ := ∑ni=1 ciXi outperforms the
straight average. That is, MSE(µˆ) ≤ MSE(µ¯), with equality if and only if
ci = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In other words, as long as the relative weights lie in between the equal
weights and the optimal weights, the accuracy of the group judgment is
increased. Even a fallacious competence ranking need not be harmful:
the resulting estimate will still be better than straight averaging. Briefly,
as long as there is a positive correlation between degrees of expertise and
impact on the group judgment, the group does well to weigh the estimates
differentially.
The litmus test for Klein and Sprenger’s results are cases where some
of their idealizing assumptions fail, e.g., independence or unbiasedness.
For example, training, experience, risk attitude or personality structure
may bias the agents’ estimates into a certain direction. In assessing the
impact of industrial development on a natural habitat, an environmental-
ist will usually come up with an estimate that significantly differs from
the estimate submitted by an employee of a corporation that intends to ex-
ploit the habitat—even if both are intellectually honest and share the same
information. In these circumstances, the agents should not be modeled
as unbiased statistical estimators, but as estimators whose mean value is
different from µ. However, as long as the differentially weighted bias is
smaller or equal than the average bias, the baseline results remain valid
and differential weighting still outperforms straight averaging (Section 3
in Klein and Sprenger 2015).
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Consider now the case where agents are not independent, but where
their opinions are correlated with each other, e.g., because they draw from
similar information sources (e.g., Goldman 2001). This may happen be-
cause they use similar research methods or because they share informa-
tion with each other. For this case, Klein and Sprenger show the following
result:
Theorem 6 Let X1, . . . , Xn be unbiased estimators, that is, E[Xi] = µ = 0, and
let the ci satisfy the conditions of one of the baseline results, with µˆ defined as
before. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of the group members with the property
∀i, j 6= k ∈ I : ci ≥ cj ⇒ E[XjXk] ≥ E[XiXk] ≥ 0. (6)
(i) Correlation vs. Expertise If I = {1, . . . , n}, then weighted averaging out-
performs straight averaging, that is, MSE(µˆ) ≤ MSE(µ¯).
(ii) Correlated Subgroup Assume that E
[
XiXj
]
= 0 if i ∈ I and j /∈ I, and
that
1
|I|∑i∈I
ci ≤ 1n
n
∑
i=1
ci. (7)
Then weighted averaging still outperforms straight averaging, that is, MSE(µˆ) ≤
MSE(µ¯).
To fully understand this theorem, we have to clarify the meaning of
condition (6). Basically, it says that in group I, experts are less correlated
with other (sub)group members than non-experts.
Once we have understood this condition, the rest is straightforward.
Part (i) states that if I equals the entire group, then differential weighting
has an edge over averaging. That is, the benefits of expertise recognition
are not offset by the perturbations that mutual dependencies may intro-
duce. Arguably, the generality of the result is surprising since condition
(6) is quite weak. Part (ii) states that differential weighting is also superior
whenever there is no correlation with the rest of the group, and as long as
the average competence in the subgroup is lower than the overall average
competence (see equation (7)).
It is a popular opinion (e.g., Surowiecki 2004) that correlation of in-
dividual judgments is one of the greatest dangers for relying on experts
in a group. To some extent, this opinion is reflected by the above theo-
rem. However, expertise-informed group judgments may still be superior
to straight averaging, as demonstrated by Theorem 6. Thus, the interplay
of correlation and expertise is subtle and cannot be generalized easily.
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Summing up, taking into account relative accuracy positively affects
the epistemic performance of groups even if the ranking of experts is only
partially reliable (Theorem 4 and 5). The result remains stable over sev-
eral representative extensions of the model, such as various forms of bias,
violations of independence, and over- and underconfident agents (e.g.,
Theorem 6). In particular, differential weighting is superior (i) if experts
are, on average, less biased; (ii) if all agents share the same sort of bias; (iii)
if experts are less correlated with the rest of the group than other group
members. These properties may be surprising and demonstrate the sta-
bility and robustness of expertise-informed judgments, implying that the
benefits of recognizing experts may offset the practical problems linked
with that process. The parsimony of this model and the independence of
specific distributional assumptions suggest that these qualitative phenom-
ena are likely to occur in reality, too.
6 Expert Judgment Literature
While the preceding sections dealt with various formal models for describ-
ing opinion aggregation and group judgments, this section surveys a lim-
ited number of empirical results regarding the elicitation and practical use
of individual expertise. In particular, we present empirical justifications
for both egalitarian and differential strategies in opinion aggregation.
6.1 Justification of Egalitarian Approaches
The empirical literature on expert judgment reflects the divisions and
problems of the formal literature. On the one hand, scholars have sup-
ported equal weighting and independent forecasts on grounds that giving
more weight to a method or another is unjustified unless the results are
already known. Let us take an example: Imagine that an economist and
a political scientist are forecasting the next 50 years of growth-rates for
China. The two scientists may not only use different prediction strategies,
but also focus on different sources of evidence: The economist may be in-
clined to use model-projections from past time-series, while the political
scientist may rely on his personal rules-of-thumb, and “eyeball” her esti-
mates based on intuitions about likely historical trends of nations with an
economic history similar to today’s China. Who is to be weighted more?
Which of the two strategies is the most successful one cannot be known
a-priori. If the world stays more or less the same, we may expect model-
projections to be more accurate than eyeballing. But time-series projections
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suffer from known “broken-leg problems” (Bishop and Trout 2005, 45-53);
that is, they ignore data that is particularly disruptive of otherwise smooth
time-series. A political economist might be inclined to take China’s aging
problem more seriously than someone who looked only at index numbers;
for instance, as a warning of the fact that China may well hit a growth-rate
plateau in the next few decades.
Typically, in the selection of expertise we can nonetheless rely on the
fact that experts are already selected with respect to their past perfor-
mance. So the sociologist might be preferred over the economist, or vice-
versa, on grounds that she has forecast past geopolitical events more suc-
cessfully. We could, that is, give differential weights on the basis of past
performance. This strategy too has its own flaws. In order for past per-
formance to be meaningful—my judgment is as likely to be correct in the
future as it has been in the past—the class of forecasts we are considering
must be the relevant one. But it is often difficult to know which class of
forecasts is the relevant one for the kind of problem we are considering.
Kitcher offers a good example of the problem of relevance: In a thor-
ough reconstruction of the disagreements over climate change, Oreskes
and Conway (2010) show how several climate change skeptics had in fact
obtained their status of experts in fields other than those relevant to cli-
mate sciences (see Kitcher 2010).
Consider the following simplified illustration. Let us assume that the
political economist, in the example above, is a very reliable long-term fore-
caster of geopolitical events—she has successfully forecasted the geopolit-
ical situation of several countries many years in advance. The economist,
on the other hand, can very reliably predict the trend of key economic in-
dicators (GDP, inflation, public debt, etc.). On the one hand, when purely
economic factors are more likely to affect China’s GDP growth in the next
50 years—that is, assuming a relative stability of the geopolitical system—
then the economist has probably a better track record than the political
scientist. On the other hand, if we think that geopolitical events are more
likely to shape the future of Chinese growth, then the political scientist
will likely have a better shot at the correct forecast. What the example
highlights is that the two track records of individual experts are not al-
ways comparable—see Reiss (2008, 38-41) and Martini (2014) for a more
detailed discussion.
In sum, selecting experts on grounds of performance indicators, cre-
dentials, etc. can be like comparing apples and oranges. There are often
no one-dimensional meters of comparison with which to assess expertise.
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Worse still, a scale can be handpicked by a relevant interest group in order
to favor a preferred (biased) outcome as the right outcome. For the fore-
going reasons, whenever we do not have a clear picture of the problem, of
the kind of expertise that is relevant to it, etc., then we have an argument
for egalitarian aggregation mechanisms, that is: equal-weighted averag-
ing. Equal-weighted averaging is discussed in extensively in Armstrong
(2001) and typically used in the Delphi Method for aggregating opinions
(see Dalkey 2002). In his Principles of Forecasting Armstrong recommends
using “equal weights unless you have strong evidence to support unequal
weighting of forecasts” (2001, 422). He refers to Clemen, who “conducted
a comprehensive review of the evidence and found equal weighting to be
accurate for many types of forecasting” (see Clemen 1989). However, Arm-
strong notices, “the studies that [Clemen] examined did not use domain
knowledge.” (2001, 422) It is on the caveat of ‘domain knowledge’ that dif-
ferential aggregation models can, under certain conditions, be preferable
to egalitarian ones, as the next section will illustrate.
6.2 Justification of Differential Approaches
In some cases using differential weighting is justified by the fact that some
of the members in the group possess more knowledge than others, and
are therefore more likely to give accurate judgments. This typically hap-
pens in contexts where domain knowledge is involved. Domain knowledge
is knowledge that is typical of a specific subject, field of research, etc., and
is therefore most likely in possession of those with advanced training or
experience in that field. To give an example, forecasting the trend of an
economic indicator by means of an econometric model involves domain
specific knowledge of statistics and econometric modeling; unlike the case
of forecasting general geopolitical trends, which involves domain-general,
rather than domain-specific, knowledge. But let us take a different case.
Cooke (1991, 159ff.) reports on an experiment conducted at a Dutch train-
ing facility for operators of large technological systems. The experiment
involved highly trained professionals, and aimed at testing whether ex-
perience is correlated with calibration. Subjects were tested over general
knowledge questions and domain-specific questions. Following are some
examples of the two types2.
• General knowledge questions
2The examples are taken from Cooke (1991) and from Alpert and Raiffa (1982), the
latter being the source of some of Cooke’s own experimental questionnaires.
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– What was the total egg production in millions in the U.S. in
1965?
– What is the total number of students currently enrolled in the
Doctoral Program at the Harvard Business School?
• Domain knowledge questions
– What is the maximal efficiency of the Tyne RM1A gas turbine?
– What is the maximum admissible intake temperature for gas in
the Olympus power turbine?
The distinction between general knowledge and domain knowledge is
not a clear-cut one, leaving much room for debate in places where the two
might overlap considerably. Nonetheless, we can safely say that general
knowledge questions can usually be answered by reasoning on items of
information that are widely shared. When trying to answer the question
of how many students are currently enrolled at Harvard’s MBA, we might
be helped by reasoning over the following questions: How many students
are typically enrolled in a university? How many in a typical American
university? How large the Harvard Business School can be with respect
to a typical business school? What is the minimum size of a business
school to operate efficiently? So reasoning over related questions is likely
to take us close to a reasonable range—i.e.,the Harvard Business School
has between 1000 and 5000 students.
Unlike general knowledge, domain knowledge involves, in the first
place, a terminology that is only mastered with specific education or train-
ing. The average educated person probably has very little information on
how to even express the efficiency of a turbine, viz. ‘what are the units?’. It
is even less likely that we could find anyone who is not versed in the field
of engineering, or more specifically aerospace engineering, who possesses
the relevant information for estimating the admissible intake temperature
of a turbine, or the efficacy of a specific model of turbine like ‘Tyne RM1A’
(cf. above).
Domain knowledge problems are such that we can often make a dis-
tinction between “experts” and “laymen”, and for which we can hope to
find sensible differential weights to be used in aggregation. The two im-
portant question then remain, from an empirical perspective, when to use
differential aggregation, as opposed to equal weights, and, if used, how
to find appropriate weights. The formal literature can help us find ag-
gregation rules that respect a number of formal desiderata. But empirical
assessment is just as important in discovering the efficiency of different
weighting schemas.
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It should be noted here that there are two general strategies for se-
lecting weights: ex-ante weighting and ex-post weighting (see Ashton and
Ashton 1985). The former strategy looks at reasons for choosing a certain
weighting scheme based on evidence that is anterior to the results of the
weighting. For instance, a manipulable weighting function that excludes
(or reduces the importance of) some experts based on irrelevant evidence
may be discarded a priori. But choosing an ex-ante weighting scheme may
not be enough: we may want to calibrate the weights by an empirical (i.e.,
ex-post) assessment of the weighting scheme. An influential a posteriori
strategy for selecting weights is given in Cooke (1991): weights are found
by averaging an expert’s performance on a number of seed questions in
his or her own field of expertise, and relative to the field of expertise that
is deemed relevant to the problem at hand. Seed questions are selected
among knowledge items that are relevant for the problem in which the
facilitator is interested, but whose answers are not known in advance by
the agent that is being assessed. A seed problem could be, for example,
“estimate the probability of failure of the Tyne RM1A gas turbine under a
certain level of mechanical stress”.
In Cooke’s methodology, weights relative to expert X are determined
on the basis of expert X’s performance on a “quiz” that the facilitator
thinks is relevant for the problem she is interested in. An engineer who is
asked to assess the risks related to a nuclear power plant will be assessed
(and weighted) on the basis of seed questions related, for instance, to com-
ponents of nuclear power plants, the materials used in the contraction of
power plants, etc. There is clearly an extrapolation problem here: The
seed questions, it is assumed, are indicative of expertise in the problem
of interest. This is clearly something that needs to be evaluated case-by-
case, when formulating seed questions, and there seems to be no a-priori
method for deciding which seed questions are valuable and which ones
are not. While it is illustrative of how we can asses a weighting schema
ex-post, Cooke’s method is limited in that it can only be applied in cases
where the problem is defined at a very detailed level, and where relevant
seed questions are available. The burden of proof is therefore on those
who want to use differential weighting to prove their case (see also Arm-
strong 2001).
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7 Conclusions
This article has given a survey over the problem of combining individ-
ual judgments into group judgments, with a distinct focus on individual
expertise and differential weighting.
Our survey revealed that there are different conceptions of group ra-
tionality in opinion aggregation, and that their appropriate use depends
on the context. For example, in democratic decision-making, egalitarian
weighting schemes are usually compulsory. Whereas in scientific contexts,
considerations of expertise or relevant experience (e.g., in medical diagno-
sis) may be more forceful and motivate the use of a differential weighting
scheme. The epistemic benefits and drawbacks of such schemes have been
investigated theoretically in Section 5 and empirically in Section 6.
It also transpired that there is not necessarily an all-encompassing ac-
count of group rationality. The impossibility results in Section 2 and 3
show that for a logically interconnected agenda of propositions, there may
be no opinion aggregation procedure that satisfies a set of plausible and
intuitive constraints. These results hold for the aggregation of binary judg-
ments as well as for the aggregation of graded attitudes, e.g., degrees of
belief. This was actually one of the reasons why we have investigated the
problem of aggregating a single numerical estimate in Section 4 and 5.
While Section 4 investigated the rationality of belief revision and reach-
ing a consensus, Section 5 gave a general epistemic analysis of differential
weighting schemes, albeit in a simple statistical model.
It is a typical feature of the literature on opinion aggregation and ex-
pertise that there is a variety of approaches spread over different disci-
plines and research methods: the same problem may be tackled from the
point of view of social choice theory, (formal) epistemology, mathematics
and statistics, economics, experimental psychology, management science,
and risk studies. Therefore our survey necessarily remains incomplete.
However, we hope to have given the reader a taste of the diversity of the
approaches to modeling individual expertise, as well as of the enormously
complex interplay between formal models of group judgments and empir-
ical studies. In particular, we hope to have created a better understanding
of the differences between egalitarian and differential models of opinion
aggregation and group decision-making, and of the philosophical ratio-
nales behind them.
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